I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent interpretations of the North Carolina Constitution, the Supreme Court of North Carolina adopted and developed a unique form of intermediate scrutiny. Blankenship v. Bartlett 1 addressed a challenge to judicial districts under the state equal protection clause.
2 King ex rel.
Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort County Board of Education
3 decided a state constitutional claim to alternative-education services during a disciplinary suspension. 4 By applying intermediate scrutiny, the court resolved these two challenging state constitutional cases.
As the name implies-and as the bench and bar know very wellintermediate scrutiny falls somewhere "in between" strict scrutiny and rational basis review. 5 Strict scrutiny, the "most exacting scrutiny," is applied to suspect classifications and those impinging on fundamental * Senior Associate Justice and Research Assistant, Supreme Court of North Carolina. Nothing in this Article should be viewed as an opinion about the merits of pending or future cases that may come before the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The purpose of this Article is to chronicle significant legal developments in North Carolina and place them in the academic literature on state constitutional adjudication. The legal value vel non of these developments and their implications for future cases are left to the academy and other legal commentators. We wish to thank Justice Robert H. Edmunds, Tom Davis, and Jake Parker for their assistance with this Article. The more suspect the classification in question, the stricter the scrutiny employed by the tribunal. Legislation of a general nature is subject only to rational basis review; more suspect classifications, such as gender, are subject to intermediate scrutiny; the most suspect classes, such as race, are subject to strict scrutiny."). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 rights 6 and requires that the classification be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 7 Challenges that do not involve fundamental rights or suspect classes receive rational basis review, the minimum level of scrutiny, which requires a challenged classification to be "rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." 8 Intermediate scrutiny, which has generally been applied to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy, requires a classification to be "substantially related to an important government objective." 7. Dep't of Transp. v. Rowe, 549 S.E.2d 203, 207 (N.C. 2001) ("If a regulation receives strict scrutiny, then the state must prove that the classification is necessary to advance a compelling government interest; otherwise, the statute is invalid.").
8. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; see also Rowe, 549 S.E.2d at 207 ("If a regulation draws any other classification, it receives only rational-basis scrutiny, and the party challenging the regulation must show that it bears no rational relationship to any legitimate government interest. If the party cannot so prove, the regulation is valid.").
9. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; see also Rowe, 549 S.E.2d at 207 ("Other classifications, including gender and illegitimacy, trigger intermediate scrutiny, which requires the state to prove that the regulation is substantially related to an important government interest.").
10 
A. A Brief History
The State of North Carolina has had three constitutions. The "Independence Constitution" of 1776 and its accompanying Declaration of Rights enshrined the principle of separation of powers, expressly declared the right of citizens to be free from governmental interference, and elaborated the basic structure of government.
11 It placed most of the power in the hands of the state legislature and the property owners who were the only citizens entitled to vote. 12 Extensive amendments in 1835 reflected a westward shift in the political center of the state that resulted from frontier settlement. 13 The "Reconstruction Constitution" of 1868 was drafted following the Civil War according to the requirements of federal legislation.
14 It included the 1776 constitution's Declaration of Rights, strengthened the executive branch, expanded the right to vote, established a uniform court system, and elaborated the methods for taxation. 15 Notably, a set of thirty amendments ratified in 1876 restored power to the state legislature that had been lost in the 1868 constitution.
16
The current constitution was adopted in 1970 and took effect in 1971.
17 It incorporated revisions recommended by a constitutional study commission chaired by a former chief justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
18
The commission's suggested revisions deleted obsolete or invalid provisions and consolidated and revised the constitutional text for clarity. 19 Like other states, North Carolina's constitution has been amended much more frequently than the U.S. Constitution. For example, in the period between 1869 and 1968, there were ninety-seven proposed amendments to the 1868 constitution; of these, voters ratified sixty-nine and rejected the other twenty-eight. 25 The frequency of amendments to the North Carolina Constitution has continued to the present day. In the November 2010 elections, North Carolina voters approved an amendment that prevents convicted felons from running for the office of sheriff. 26 In an indication of how quickly an amendment to the state constitution can pass, the state legislature had submitted the amendment in a session law passed on July 1, 2010, 27 just four months before the election. The next most recent amendments were presented during the 2004 elections-all three amendments passed and, respectively, addressed the distribution of civil fines and forfeitures to public schools, expanded the terms of magistrate judges, and authorized self-financing bonds for public improvements. According to a 1998 scholarly appraisal, "the unamended text of the typical state constitution remains over three times as long as that of the federal Constitution." 29 A comparison of North Carolina's constitution with the U.S. Constitution-including its twenty-seven amendmentsreveals that the North Carolina Constitution, at 17,082 words, is just over twice as long as the U.S. Constitution, at 7708 words. 30 While word count does not necessarily translate directly into significant constitutional text, the larger size of the North Carolina Constitution is suggestive of more plentiful opportunities for litigants to make claims and for the judiciary to find guidance in resolving legal controversies. As the Supreme Court of North Carolina has explained, the North Carolina "Constitution is more detailed and specific than the federal Constitution in the protection of the rights of its citizens." Despite the strong assertion of national power evident in Justice Story's opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the state courts retained their sovereign position as primary guarantors of the people's civil liberties. After all, the federal Constitution, with its narrowly defined scope, did not address the rights of state citizens, but only federal citizens. So it worked, unquestioned in practice if not in theory, until the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War. This time period, often referred to as the "vast transformation," saw a tremendous metamorphosis in both the conception and role of the federal Constitution as a vehicle for protecting people from state actions that denied them liberties. Indeed, the effect of the passage of the Civil War amendments was not lost on those in Congress who lobbied for their passage. Cognizant of the sweeping changes in our federal system that the amendments would likely bring about, the drafters and supporters of the amendments forged ahead nonetheless because of the belief that the states had, in many cases, abdicated their responsibilities and duties.
38
While not discounting the importance of the historical state constitutional adjudications both before and after the Reconstruction amendments, this Article's focus is within the "renaissance" period beginning in the 1970s. Although an exhaustive survey of North Carolina state constitutional adjudications is beyond the scope of this Article, a cursory search of legal databases reveals a trend of increased reliance. The year 1970 was chosen as the starting date for the search, as it marks the beginning of a decade and is close in time to 1971, the year when the current constitution took effect. 40 The data shown in Figure 1 below was gathered by conducting searches on both Westlaw and LEXIS for citations to the North Carolina Constitution in opinions issued by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. ten percent of the citations to the North Carolina Constitution are made in the same sentence as citations to the U.S. Constitution, usually in the resolution of a criminal appeal. 42 The following citation is representative of these types of cases: "The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also N.C. Const. art. I, § § 18, 19, 23." 43 Nonetheless, the fact that the Supreme Court of North Carolina is more frequently citing the North Carolina Constitution for support-whether independently or as part of an in-depth state constitutional adjudication-indicates an increased awareness of the potential value of the state constitution.
In his 1977 article encouraging reliance on state constitutional provisions, Justice Brennan wrote that it was "not easy to pinpoint why state courts [were] . . . beginning to emphasize the protections of their states' own bills of rights." 44 He then went on to suggest that the reliance on state constitutions was a reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's reluctance to further extend constitutional protections of individual rights. 45 As a practical and procedural matter, the frequency of state constitutional adjudications ultimately rests with the bar. If a plaintiff's attorney does not include state constitutional claims in a complaint, they are extremely unlikely to materialize at trial or on appeal. If an appellate defender arguing error in a criminal trial does not elaborate state constitutional grounds for the appeal, they may be waived and are not likely to be considered by the courts. In the words of former Chief Justice Exum of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, "[o]ne of the tasks of advocacy is to raise the level of consciousness of those the advocate is trying to persuade. . . . So it is with state constitutional law. The level of the court's consciousness about it can be raised. Lawyers 42. A search within the Westlaw results for "U.S. Const." within the same sentence as "N.C. Const." indicates that 30 of the 309 total cases include such "parallel constitutional" citations. A similar search in LEXIS revealed that 27 of the 270 total cases include parallel constitutional citations. While some of these cases with parallel constitutional citations may engage in comprehensive analysis of the North Carolina Constitution, the result is suggestive. This result also comports with the general observations made during a brief read through a random selection of these cases.
43 are the ones to raise it." 46 In his 1977 article, Justice Brennan also "suggest[ed] to the bar that, although in the past it might have been safe for counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state courts, plainly it would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state constitutional questions." 47 The words of these justices ring true today. While state constitutional claims end in the courts, they begin with the practicing bar.
C. Models of State Constitutional Adjudication and North Carolina's Approach
Once state constitutional matters arrive in the courts, the method of analysis applied by the courts becomes the most pertinent issue. The generally accepted schema for constitutional decisions of state appellate courts consists of four interrelated models-primacy, interstitial, dual sovereignty, and lockstep-that characterize a state's interpretation of its constitution relative to federal interpretations of identical or analogous provisions of the U.S. Constitution. 48 The primacy model recognizes the 46. Exum, supra note 33, at 9; see also State v. Bryant, 614 S.E.2d 479, 485 (N.C. 2005) ("Although this Court has previously reserved the right to grant Section 19 relief against unreasonable and arbitrary state statutes in circumstances where relief might not be obtainable under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we note that defendant does not seek independent relief under the Law of the Land Clause." (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Acker & Walsh, supra note 21, at 1311 ("State courts' reliance upon state law to resolve issues that also present federal questions is, in one sense, neither new nor innovative. It is a stratagem, however, that was all but forgotten by one generation of lawyers, and not learned by another, in the midst of the Warren Court's nationalization of Federal Bill of Rights protections during the 1960s." (emphasis added)).
47. Brennan, supra note 31, at 502; see also McGregor, supra note 36, at 279 ("If Arizona is to continue its progress toward developing a coherent approach to state constitutional law and find a way to apply that approach consistently, regardless of which state constitutional provision is at issue, the courts require the assistance of lawyers." (emphasis added)). Then-Vice Chief Justice McGregor goes on to quote then-Judge Souter's special concurrence in State v. Bradberry:
It is the need of every appellate court for the participation of the bar in the process of trying to think sensibly and comprehensively about the questions that the judicial power has been established to answer. Nowhere is the need greater than in the field of State constitutional law, where we are asked so often to confront questions that have already been decided under the National Constitution. If we place too much reliance on federal precedent we will render the State rules a mere row of shadows; if we place too little, we will render State practice incoherent. If we are going to steer between these extremes, we will have to insist on developed advocacy from those who bring the cases before us. Id. at 279-80 (quoting State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J., concurring specially)).
48. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 24, at 180-85 (discussing the "lockstep," "primacy," and "interstitial" approaches); Acker & Walsh, supra note 21, at 1315-19 (characterizing the models as "lockstep" or "equivalence," "primacy," "interstitial" or "supplemental," and "dual sovereignty"); Anderson & Oseid, supra note 37, at 878-86 (describing and critiquing the four approaches); James state constitution as a fundamental source of rights and accordingly begins analysis with provisions from the state constitution. 49 The interstitial model views U.S. constitutional rights as minimal and seeks supplementation from the interstices when the federal right does not resolve the claim or where the state constitution has more expansive language. 50 Under the dual-sovereignty model, both constitutions are analyzed more or less simultaneously. 51 The lockstep model construes state constitutional provisions identically with analogous provisions in the U.S. Constitution.
52
The approach of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is best characterized as lockstep, with some notable exceptions, two of which are the subject of this Article. As an example, in the realm of due process, the North Carolina Constitution's law of the land clause provides: "No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." When state courts engage in such a binding lockstep analysis, they fail to provide the "'double security' for rights" that is part of our federal system. 59 To the extent that these criticisms are directed at state courts that mechanically adopt federal interpretations, they seem appropriate. But such criticisms do not necessarily apply to North Carolina's lockstep approach, which considers federal authorities persuasive-not binding. Supporters of lockstep analysis acknowledge this division between "binding lockstep" and "persuasive lockstep." While the ultimate determination of legal rights might be the same in many cases, persuasive lockstep analysis leaves the door open for a state court to diverge from federal jurisprudence. One supporter of lockstep analysis expresses the notion of persuasive lockstep as follows:
Lockstep analysis, one might say, does not necessarily reveal an abandonment by state courts of their responsibilities to protect liberty and to reflect meaningfully upon the best ways to do so. On the contrary, it might well represent a discharge of those responsibilities, but in circumstances where the state court feels that the national government is already doing a reasonably good job. In those circumstances, a state court might reasonably conclude that there is no need, at least for the moment, to explore in any greater depth the possibilities presented by the state constitution to protect liberty any more or less vigorously than it is already protected by the national judicial analysis. Lockstep analysis thus need not represent an absence of independent constitutional judgment; it can just as easily represent the outcome of a fully-informed exercise of independent state judicial judgment.
Jeffrey Usman helpfully catalogs the arguments made by supporters of lockstep analysis:
Advocates of state court adherence to federal precedent (1) question whether states are really distinct political communities with divergent identities, (2) assert the importance of national values to constitutional interpretation, (3) note that many state provisions are modeled on the Federal Constitution, (4) suggest reliance preserves judicial resources by allowing state courts to tap into a huge volume of decisions addressing the requirements of the Federal Constitution, (5) caution that reliance avoids varying mandates that could be confusing for state officials, and (6) claim that reliance fosters judicial restraint. Setting aside a more thorough examination of the drawbacks and benefits of persuasive lockstep, the fact remains that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has typically followed this form of analysis. 63 The opinions in which North Carolina's highest court has followed U.S. Supreme Court rulings-while they may include rationales that diverge slightly from the federal rationale for the rule-do not provide much opportunity for analyzing North Carolina's unique place among the courts of this country. But the Supreme Court of North Carolina has stepped "out of lockstep" in several cases to address an exclusively state constitutional matter or interpret a state constitutional provision differently. 64 In two of these cases, the court has adopted intermediate scrutiny as a resolution to the constitutional conflict. 65 
III. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN NORTH CAROLINA

A. Intermediate Scrutiny in Federal and Other State Courts
As typically phrased by the U. 
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repeatedly noted, "the degree of judicial skepticism or deference varies considerably within levels of scrutiny." 68 Speaking generally, the most that can be said with certainty is that intermediate scrutiny simply falls somewhere "in between" rational basis review and strict scrutiny. 69 The flexibility in the intensity of review under intermediate scrutiny has made it a useful tool within the federal court system. In addition to its well-known use for classifications based on gender and legitimacy, 70 intermediate scrutiny has been applied to in-between claims where underlying constitutional rights are qualified in some fashion. A good example of such an application of intermediate scrutiny can be seen in the Fourth Circuit's determination of the appropriate standard for a challenge to a curfew for minors: Initially we must consider the level of scrutiny appropriate to this case.
Plaintiffs contend that the ordinance infringes minors' constitutional liberties and therefore should be subject to strict scrutiny. It is true that a child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution. Minors enjoy some rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments before they attain adulthood. At the same time, the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that children's rights are not coextensive with those of adults. Traditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination-including even the right of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will.
In recognition of these customary limitations, the state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults. State laws do not permit children to drive a car before they reach a certain age. Compulsory attendance laws require children to attend school. Labor laws limit the opportunities of children to engage in gainful employment. These types of laws reflect the state's general interest in youth's well being.
In light of the case law, two things seem clear. First, children do possess at least qualified rights, so an ordinance which restricts their liberty to the extent that this one does should be subject to more than rational basis review. Second, because children do not possess the same rights as adults, the ordinance should be subject to less than the strictest level of scrutiny. We thus believe intermediate scrutiny to be the most appropriate level of review and must determine whether the ordinance is substantially related to important governmental interests. ecause the United States Constitution is binding on the states, the rights it guarantees must be applied to every citizen by the courts of North Carolina, so no citizen will be 'accorded lesser rights' no matter how we construe the state Constitution. . . . Blankenship and King involved interpretations of the North Carolina Constitution to provide greater rights than are found under the U.S. Constitution. Representing the first category of state constitutional adjudications, Blankenship interpreted the state equal protection clause to find greater rights for voters than exist under the federal counterpart.
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King, on the other hand, addressed an exclusively state constitutional matter-the extent of the state constitutional right to education for longterm suspended students. 81 Both cases involved the application of state constitutional intermediate scrutiny.
B. Blankenship v. Bartlett
The legislative redistricting that occurs soon after each national census frequently leads to challenges in state and federal courts.
82 North Carolina is no exception. The challenges to legislative redistricting brought in the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s were all filed in or successfully removed to federal court. 83 But the challenge to the 2000 redistricting was resolved by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Stephenson v. Bartlett.
84
The challenge involved "a state law question of first impression"-whether the state legislature had violated the whole-county provisions 85 of the state constitution when it enacted the 2001 legislative redistricting plans.
86
The plaintiffs, who were North Carolina registered voters, argued that the whole-county provisions prevented the General Assembly from dividing counties in creating legislative districts, "except to the extent necessary to comply with federal law. 91 Specifically, the court noted that 51 of 100 counties were divided by the senate redistricting plan and 70 of 100 counties were divided by the house redistricting plan. 92 The court ultimately held that because the General Assembly's 2001 legislative redistricting plans divided counties without a federal law justification, the plans were unconstitutional and void. 93 As part of Stephenson I, the court considered proposed remedial plans submitted by the plaintiffs. Notably, the court found that these remedial plans "implicate[d] the fundamental right to vote on equal terms, and thus strict scrutiny [was] the applicable standard."
94
On remand, the trial court found that the revised redistricting plans drawn up after the Stephenson I decision were unconstitutional. 95 The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, reiterating that the wholecounty provisions required the General Assembly to avoid dividing counties, except "to the extent necessary to comply with federal law, including the 'one-person, one-vote' principle and the [Voting Rights Act of 1965]."
96
The landmark Stephenson decisions-and the application of state constitutional provisions in that litigation-likely paved the way for the challenge to judicial districts in Blankenship v. Bartlett.
The plaintiffs in Blankenship challenged Wake County judicial districts that disproportionately distributed voting power in the elections for resident superior court judges. 97 The General Assembly created the potential imbalance in voter strength in a 1993 statutory amendment that added a judgeship to District 10A. 98 As Carolina Constitution and found that part of the article on the judiciary guaranteed "an individual right of the people to vote in [judicial] elections." 107 Reading this section with the equal protection provision, and in light of the representative aspects of state judicial office, the court held "that the right to vote in superior court elections on substantially equal terms is a quasi-fundamental right which is subject to a heightened level of scrutiny."
108
The state equal protection analysis and the quasi-fundamental right to vote under the state constitution provided the court with two frameworks to determine the applicable level of scrutiny. 109 Both analyses indicated that some form of heightened scrutiny-but not strict scrutiny-should apply.
110
In determining the form of "heightened scrutiny" applicable under the state equal protection clause, the court found "many important policy interests to be weighed in addition to population" and held that "strict scrutiny according to the one-person, one-vote rule is inappropriate here."
111 The court provided a non-exhaustive list of policy interests that the legislature might consider in drawing judicial districts, including "geography, population density, convenience, number of citizens in the district eligible to be judges, and number and types of legal proceedings in a given area."
112
With these legislative policy interests militating against strict scrutiny, the court found that the applicable scrutiny was "somewhere in between," as the following discourse indicates:
We conclude that judicial elections have a component that implicates the fundamental right to vote and a separate component that is ordinarily the province of the legislature, subject only to review for rationality by the courts. The right to vote on equal terms for representatives triggers heightened scrutiny, even as the nonrepresentative aspects inherent in the role of the judiciary preclude strict scrutiny on a one-person, one-vote standard. Thus, neither rational basis nor strict scrutiny is an appropriate standard of review. 
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The challenge to state educational funding brought in Leandro involved a somewhat complex alignment of parties, including: (1) plaintiff students and local school boards from relatively poor rural districts, (2) plaintiff-intervenors from relatively large and wealthy city school systems, and (3) the state and state board of education as defendants. 126 Collectively, the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the constitutional right to equal educational opportunities was being denied by defendants because of funding disparities. 127 The rural plaintiffs pointed to poor facilities, inadequate educational resources, low teacher salaries, and low test The urban plaintiff-intervenors claimed a disproportionate financial burden because of relatively large numbers of special-education, limited-English-proficient, and academically gifted students and argued that the burden from these students forced them to divert funding from regular education services.
129
Addressing these state constitutional challenges, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held there was a fundamental right to "an opportunity to receive a sound basic education" and that this right included a qualitative component. 130 The court defined "sound basic education" in great detail:
For purposes of our Constitution, a "sound basic education" is one that will provide the student with at least: (1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English language and a sufficient knowledge of fundamental mathematics and physical science to enable the student to function in a complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and basic economic and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices with regard to issues that affect the student personally or affect the student's community, state, and nation; (3) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to successfully engage in post-secondary education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to compete on an equal basis with others in further formal education or gainful employment in contemporary society.
131
After recognizing this state constitutional right, the court "conclude [d] that provisions of the current state system for funding schools which require or allow counties to help finance their school systems and result in unequal funding among the school districts of the state do not violate constitutional principles."
132
Leandro's recognition of a fundamental right to education proved foundational in a series of cases addressing various aspects of North Carolina's system for public education. measuring the constitutionality of content-based secondary effects regulations must vindicate the constitutional right to free speech, yet accommodate the government's interest in protecting the public health, safety, and welfare. The test has two phases. First, to qualify for intermediate scrutiny, the State must demonstrate that a content-based regulation is directed at ameliorating secondary effects, not at suppressing protected speech. Second, to survive intermediate scrutiny, the State must show that, in addressing the secondary effects, the regulation does not sweep too broadly."); Davis v. Union Pac. R.R., 937 P.2d 27, 31-32 (Mont. 1997) ("Middle-tier scrutiny requires the state to demonstrate that its classification is reasonable and that its interest in the classification is greater than that of the individual's interest in the right infringed."). The rational basis test can also be reworked in state constitutional adjudications. See, e.g., id. at 32 ("When the be definitively said is that intermediate scrutiny is simply "in between" rational basis review and strict scrutiny. 162 Compounding the fuzziness of the standard is the variability of judicial review within all three tiers of scrutiny. 163 In sum, intermediate scrutiny may not be an appropriate solution when a bright line or clear legal rule is the aim.
In the context of separation of powers, intermediate scrutiny poses the additional concern that the judiciary may potentially intrude upon the executive and legislative roles. 164 Although it is undoubtedly the role of the courts "to say what the law is," 165 
